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Segurança de NIS

Colaboração: Marcos Aguinaldo Forquesato

Data de Publicação: 23 de Agosto de 1997

Aproveitando a discussão sobre segurança de NIS, o Aguinaldo me enviou estes texto bastante abrangente sobre medidas a serem tomadas para se aumentar a segurança de redes que utilizam o NIS.

O documento original se encontra em http://www.eng.auburn.edu/users/doug/nis.html.

  Securing NIS (formerly YP)
  The following is a brief compendium of what we at Auburn Univeristy College
  of Engineering use to secure our NIS networks. We have a mix of about 65%
  NIS, 35% NIS+ network that is seeded from NIS -> NIS+ via periodic cron
  jobs. The following is our implementation of securing NIS using various
  vendor patches and free utilities from around the world.
  NIS has a reputation of being extremely insecure. If you implement these
  steps it will lose most if not all of the reasons for this, and you will
  retain all the administrative advantages of NIS without any of the security
  risks. We only have experience implementing this with SunOS4.1.X, since we
  use NIS+ on Solaris 2.X machines and since we are a predominantly Sun shop.
  All other machines may have slightly different results and implementations.
  Hopefully others will find this useful, though. Here's a list of reasons why
  you should follow these steps.
    1. People can grab your password map from any machine in the world and
       crack on it remotely.
    2. It disables several of the holes found by Satan.
    3. Local people can use ypcat to grab all the encrypted passwords and
       crack on them.
    4. Remote people can grab any map in your NIS domain. Some of these may
       have confidential information.
     * Router Modifications
       Most sites have a router connecting themselves with the outside world.
       If you have control of this router make sure you do the following to
       things, or everything else below could be completely useless. (Note,
       implementation details and configuration is router specific, and we
       can't help configure your particular brand of router.)
         1. Turn off source routing
         2. Apply a filter that makes sure that packets coming in from the
            outside network do not have source IP address that match the
            inside network. (IP spoofing) see the following CIAC announcement
            on IP spoofing attacks
         3. If practical install a router filter that blocks ALL RPC packets.
            and everything on port 111 (and 2049 if you don't export NFS
            outside your LAN(s))
       Replacing Daemons
     * Wietse Venema has written 2 excellent utilities that are absolutely
       essential for securing NIS. They are replacements for the sun shipped
       portmap and rpcbind (SunOS4.1.X, Solaris2.X) respectively. These tools
       work much the same way as tcp_wrappers by defining access lists for
       hosts that are and are not allowed to access your portmap. Without
       these tools in place a remote user can effectively use your own portmap
       as a way to circumvent security by accessing your NIS services through
       the portmap and appearing to be coming from a machine inside your
       domain. Click here to download portmap from ftp.win.tue.nl. Click here
       for rpcbind 1.1 (Solaris2.X). Both of these require that you have
       libwrap.a compiled from tcp_wrappers. Click here to get tcp_wrappers7.2
       Installing Vendor Patches
     * For SunOS4.1.3_U1B and below get the NIS patch for securenets and
       install it on your system. On SunOS 4.1.3_U1 and U1_B this is patch
       101435-03. On SunOS 4.1.[0-3] this is patch 100482-08. In your
       securenets file you should ONLY have those domains which require NIS
       maps. Use the smallest subset of domains possible. Try to not include
       subnets with PC's and macs on them if possible, since these machines
       have no concept of root; anybody could get your maps.
       Restricting Access
     * It is a very good idea to make your NIS master machine restricted
       access for administrative staff only. This is where all the jewels are
       and if it gets compromised it does not good that NIS is protected when
       the raw text files are not. It is also a good idea to turn off routed
       on this machine and install static routes to all of your local networks
       that use NIS service. This way, even if a hacker can bypass your
       portmap/securenets security, the information drops on the floor on the
       way out of your machine because it doesn't have a way back to the
       hackers site.
       Blocking TCP Attacks
     * TCP sequence number guessing attacks are on the rise. These attacks
       rely on the fact the the kernel is not very good at picking random
       numbers for TCP sequence numbers. The sequence numbers control the
       order of the packets in the TCP/IP stream. If a hacker can guess what
       sequence numbers you are using (there are now automated tools to do
       this) he can intercept your session. In theory, removing the route to
       outside networks should prevent this attack, however, if it does not,
       or if you are not able to do this, you may wish to investigate some of
       the unsuported patches (for SunOS in particular) that block this kind
       of attack by altering the TCP sequence number generation. I've placed a
       README containing the rationale and instructions for one such patch
       Shadow Passwords
     * Set your machine up to do Shadow Passwords. Contrary to popular belief,
       this does NOT require the C2 security patch. Shadow passwords can be
       enabled by following a few short easy steps. (If you use groups with
       passwords, you should do the following steps for the group.adjunct file
       as well, except for the AU* stuff)
         1. Make backup copies of the passwd maps on the NIS master and on all
            client and slave machines. Make a backup copy of the Makefile on
            your NIS master too.
         2. In the directory where you keep your NIS maps, make a directory
            called security (e.g. /var/yp/security).
            cd /var/yp
            mkdir security
            chown root security
            chmod 700 security
         3. Take all of the passwords out of your NIS master passwd map and
            stick them in a passwd.adjunct map in the security directory.
            Replace all the password entries in the password map with entries
            that have the username preceeded by two hash marks. Like this:
            The format for the shadow password map is then follows the form of
            Where password is what you removed from the passwd file. The 5
            remaining colons will never have anything in them. They are used
            by C2 security for mandatory security accesses, but that is
            irrelevant here. The following awk script will generate a
            passwd.adjunct file.
            nawk -F\: '{printf("%s:%s:::::\n", $1, $2)}' passwd >
            And the following script will fix your passwd file.
            nawk -F\: '{printf("%s:##%s:%s:%s:%s:%s:%s\n", $1, $1, $3, $4, $5,
            $6, $7)}' passwd > passwd.new
            Check the file passwd.new for any errors before replacing passwd
            with this new file. Now is also the perfect time to check for
            users that have no password and replace the emtpy password entry
            with a "*" in the passwd.adjunct file.
         4. Create an /etc/security directory on every machine. And take the
            root password (and any other local passwords) our of your
            /etc/passwd file and into /etc/security/passwd.adjunct file (like
            # mkdir /etc/security
            # chmod 700 /etc/security
            Then fill the file with something like this:
            Obviously, your root password will be taken our of your
            /etc/passwd file. The above password is nonsense anyway. If you
            want a different root password for each machine, make sure the
            root entry above has a valid password. If you want an identical
            root password for all your machines which comes out of NIS, delete
            the root line above all together.
         5. Insert the following two lines in your NIS master password map AND
            in each machines local /etc/passwd file
            Lost+found can be replaced with the name of any local directory.
         6. Insert the following two lines into your NIS master
            passwd.adjunct, and make sure they are contained in every local
            /etc/security/passwd.adjunct map as well.
         7. Make sure your rc.local file has the following set of lines
            uncommented. These provide a way for clients to authenticate a
            password as being valid or not without the password being passed
            over the net in clear text. The encrypted password is passed to
            the server for authentication.
            # start up authentication daemon if present and if adjunct file exists
            if [ -f /usr/etc/rpc.pwdauthd -a -f /etc/security/passwd.adjunct ]; then
                    rpc.pwdauthd &          echo -n ' pwdauthd'
         8. Now you need to make sure that when you update passwords and users
            that your Makefile is setup properly to push out the
            passwd.adjunct map. After the all: rule in your Makefile add a new
            entry, we've called ours c2secure. Now you need to add a make rule
            for this entry.
                    -@if [ -f $(DIR)/security/passwd.adjunct ]; then \
                            if [ ! $(NOPUSH) ]; then $(MAKE)  $(MFLAGS) -k \
                            passwd.adjunct.time group.adjunct.time; \
                            else $(MAKE) $(MFLAGS) -k NOPUSH=$(NOPUSH) \
                            passwd.adjunct.time group.adjunct.time; \
                            fi; \
         9. You now need to make sure the rpc.yppasswdd on your NIS master is
            running with the right flags. Below is a sample. The -noshell and
            -nogecos flags specify that users are not allowed to change their
            shell or their full name using the passwd command. They are not
            stricly necessary for the proper functioning of rpc.yppasswdd. One
            further note: the rpc.yppasswdd supplied with 4.1.3_U1B seems to
            crash, so we use the one from 4.1.3 instead, and it works fine.
            if [ -f /usr/etc/rpc.yppasswdd ]; then
                    rpc.yppasswdd /var/yp/dbdir/passwd /var/yp/dbdir/security/passwd.adjunct -nosingle -noshell -nogecos -m passwd.adjunct > /dev/console
                    echo -n ' yppasswdd'
        10. Finally, you need to push the maps out. First run make on your
            master. It will update the map and attempt to push it out. If you
            have slaves it may fail because the slaves don't know about this
            newly created map. Use ctrl-c to break the process and either
            ypxfr the map by hand or ypinit -s on each of the slaves to
            reinitialize and synchronize with the NIS master.
        11. Test it out. If it doesn't work let me know, I may have
            inadvertently forgotten a step. In any case, you did follow step 1
            and make backups right?
       TCP Wrappers Addendum
     * Here are some ways to setup your hosts.allow file when you have portmap
       installed. Let's assume you have a class B network with address
       129.129, subnetted using mask Now let's assume your sun
       network has 10 subnets. There are two ways you can setup your
       hosts.allow file. You can put all 10 subnets in one at a time like
       Note: the first line is not always necessary, but it's safe to include
       it. It is necessary on NIS slaves and masters that have to answer
       ypbind broadcast requests on the local network. The second approach is
       to just put a broad mask for your entire Class B network. Sometimes
       this is easier than doing every single subnet one at a time. (That
       would make for a HUGE /etc/hosts.allow file, 1 per machine. Obviously,
       this would be impractical. Here's an example of the latter approach.
     * Read the documentation included with tcp_wrappers. It's very useful
       stuff. You can apply lots of options to the above. For example, you
       could put a statement up there such that any request from an
       unauthorized host would result in a reverse finger being mailed to the
       account of your choice plug a syslog entry that could trip an alarm.
     * If you get complaints about 'audit', you'll need to mkdir
       /etc/security/audit on the machines where you run shadow passwords.
     * Congratulations! You are now immune to most of the security holes and
       attacks that been publicized widely and have plagued NIS.
  Related Documents
     * CIAC - Securing Internet Information Servers
     * Unishield is a commercial product which has been designed to plug
       several of the above security holes.
     * Cert Advisories
     * Bugtraq archive
     * Satan documentation (compressed tar)
     * SunOS satan advisory
     * Unix Security Topics at Dartmouth
  If you have any questions/comments, feel free to send me email or comments.



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